Česky

Anticorruption barometer

Transparent financing of political parties — #47 Financial management of the electoral campaign by a court appointed expert and his/her control

Only the electoral accountant should be allowed to administer party’s transparent electoral account. The party should be allowed to give binding orders to the electoral accountant: the accountant shall not comply with the order of the party which is in conflict with the law. The electoral accountant appointed by the court should accept funds which are to be registered at the party’s account, he/she should verify donors’ identity, administer transparent electoral account, make payment orders to cover the costs of electoral advertising, publish on party’s website relevant contracts, invoices and other documents. Should the appointed electoral accountant violate his/her obligations, he/she should be prosecuted by a special authority established to control electoral financing. This authority should be composed, for example, of members of the Supreme Audit Authority, the Supreme Administrative Court and the relevant professional self-regulatory organization.

Justification and sources

Update history

date	reason	effectiveness	progression
01/2017 current	The Act on political parties as well as the Act on elections to the Lower Chamber of the Parliament, as amended as of 1 January 2017, continue to keep the financial management under the control of political parties. On the one hand, these Acts foresee the auditing of the electoral campaigns financing by an auditor and the Office for supervision of financing of political parties and movements, on the other hand, they do not foresee any control nor sanctions for the auditors should they perform the audit incorrectly or inaccurately. Moreover, the Office is not composed on the basis of participatory principle bringing together representatives of other high level public institutions to prevent its undue influencing.	Effectiveness 25%	Progression 90%	More
08/2016	The approved Act on political parties as well as the proposal of law amending the Act on elections to the Lower Chamber of the Parliament, which was returned by the Upper Chamber to the Lower Chamber of the Parliament, continue to keep the financial management under the control of political parties. On the one hand, the proposed law foresees the auditing of the electoral campaigns financing by an auditor and the Office for supervision of financing of political parties and movements, on the other hand, it does not foresee any control nor sanctions for the auditors should they perform the audit incorrectly or inaccurately. In addition, the Office is not composed on the basis of participatory principle bringing together representatives of other high level public institutions to prevent its undue influencing.	Effectiveness 25%	Progression 60%	More
07/2016	The existing Act on political parties, the proposed law amending this Act or the proposal of law amending the Act on elections to the Lower Chamber of the Parliament, which are in the Upper Chamber of the Parliament, continue to keep the financial management under the control of political parties. On the one hand, the proposed law foresees the auditing of the electoral campaigns financing by an auditor and the Office for supervision of financing of political parties and movements, on the other hand, it does not foresee any control nor sanctions for the auditors should they perform the audit incorrectly or inaccurately. In addition, the Office is not composed on the basis of participatory principle bringing together representatives of other high level public institutions to prevent its undue influencing.	Effectiveness 25%	Progression 70%	More
08/2015	The existing on political parties nor the proposed law amending this Act which is in the Lower Chamber of the Parliament continues to keep the financial management under the control of political parties. On the one hand, the proposed law foresees the auditing of the electoral campaigns financing by an auditor and the Office for supervision of financing of political parties and movements, on the other hand, it does not foresee any control nor sanctions for the auditors should they perform the audit incorrectly or inaccurately. In addition, the Office is not composed on the basis of participatory principle bringing together representatives of other high level public institutions to prevent its undue influencing.	Effectiveness 25%	Progression 60%	More